New leader must reconsider his stance on Tibet

Press Release 4 November 2002

Hu Jintao, the man widely expected to become General Secretary of the Communist Party of China during the 16th Party Congress, which opens in Beijing on 8 November, does not deserve his reputation as a moderate and cautious leader, says Free Tibet Campaign, based on the findings of a report published today. The organisation is calling on Hu Jintao to develop a more sophisticated view of Tibet than he has displayed in the past, and spearhead the resolution of its occupation through unconditional negotiations with the Tibetan Government-in-exile.

"Hu Jintao: Reformer or Conformist?" documents Hu's tenure as Party Secretary in Tibet (1988-1992) and his continuing role in Beijing's approach to governing the region. In Tibet Hu Jintao not only oversaw the imposition of martial law, but introduced a system of control which permeated all aspects of Tibetan life that was unprecedented since the Cultural Revolution, and brought to an end the more liberal approach initiated by Hu Yaobang in 1980.

"Given the paucity of information about Hu Jintao, this new report detailing his relationship with Tibet provides a useful indicator of what his strategic objectives may be, especially with regard to China's 'minorities'," said Alison Reynolds of Free Tibet Campaign. "We have concluded that Hu's attitude towards Tibet is not indicative of a man who will show concern for the welfare of the Tibetan people. In the immediate future, it can be expected that he will vigorously promote the Western Development strategy and continue Tibet's further integration with the Chinese motherland. Depending on Hu Jintao's ability to build up his power base, we may even see a more aggressive approach to assimilating Tibet."

Free Tibet Campaign calls on Hu Jintao to take up Jiang Zemin's recent initiative to develop contact with the Tibetan Government-in-exile. However, the organisation is concerned that the distrust Hu has so far displayed towards the Tibetan people, as revealed in its report, is not conducive to building an atmosphere in which meaningful negotiations can take place. Alison Reynolds adds, "The real test to China's sincerity in moving this dialogue with the Tibetan Government forward will come when the leadership changes are complete. The onus will be on China to demonstrate that this initiative was not mere window-dressing for the benefit of Jiang Zemin's final visit to the United States as President of China."

Hu's governorship of Tibet represented a turning point in the way Tibet policy was devised. Besides using the period of martial law to introduce more sophisticated methods of control to promote stability, Hu Jintao introduced a strategy of "grasping with both hands" which sought to use economic development as a tool in the "struggle against separatism". This and the increased administrative interference in cultural and religious spheres, which was introduced during Hu's tenure, are legacies which can still be seen in Tibet today.

Free Tibet Campaign has concluded that Hu's role as an architect of hardline policies towards Tibet, both during his tenure and in his role in the Politburo, demonstrates an intrinsic lack of concern about the welfare of Tibetans, and goes beyond his political imperatives, which many claim have determined his actions.

Context:

Two envoys of the Dalai Lama were invited to Beijing and Lhasa in September for 'talks about talks'. On 9 September, the Dalai Lama's Private Office announced that Special Envoy Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari and Envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen would visit Beijing and Lhasa. "His Holiness the Dalai Lama is very pleased that the team is able to make such a visit," said the statement. The news was welcomed in all circles. The European Union said that it had "long encouraged both sides to enter into dialogue. The EU hopes that this visit will pave the way for direct dialogue between Beijing and the Dalai Lama leading to a peaceful and lasting solution to the Tibetan question."

Beijing played down the visit. Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan told reporters, "There were some Tibetan expatriates allowed to come back to China in a private capacity." Kong reiterated China's standard pre-conditions to negotiations; that the Dalai Lama must agree that Tibet and Taiwan are part of China and stop all "splittist" activities. In Tibet, Deputy Party Secretary Legchog claimed that the two sides did not discuss the Dalai Lama and he expressed doubt about the Dalai Lama's sincerity, stating, "his words do not match his deeds... What he now advocates, a high degree of national autonomy for Tibet and a referendum, cannot hold water. (It) is a disguised independence of Tibet."

Special Envoy Lodi Gyari issued a statement on his return to Dharamsala on 28 September, in which he described his priorities as being to re-establish direct contact with the leadership in Beijing, to create a conducive atmosphere enabling direct face-to-face meetings on a regular basis, and to explain the Dalai Lama's Middle Way Approach. He said, "We focused our effort towards building confidence by dispelling distrust and misconception." In Beijing, Gyari said the delegation met Ministers and officials and "had frank exchanges of views with them in a cordial atmosphere... Since I had the opportunity to meet Chinese leaders in Beijing in the early 1980s, what impressed us more this time was the much greater flexibility displayed by the current leaders in their mental attitude." Prime Minister Samdhong Rinpoche said he hoped the two sides could start talks on Tibet's status by July 2003. The last official contact between the two governments was in 1993.

These developments appear to be the initiative of Jiang Zemin. One interpretation is that Jiang Zemin has found it expedient to make gestures on Tibet as a means to enhance his image as an international statesman and his relationship with the United States. The flurry of press coverage about Jiang's abilities as a politician in the Chinese press over the summer seems to indicate that he does not plan to retire from the world stage or relinquish all internal influence, despite probably handing over all his formal titles and positions over the next five months.

Despite the release of a number of Tibetan political prisoners this year, Tibet remained on the agenda of Jiang Zemin's summit with George W Bush in Crawford, Texas. On 25 October Bush told the media that he had asked Jiang to begin dialogue with Tibetan leaders to resolve the Tibetan issue, "I also spoke of the importance of respecting human rights in Tibet and encouraged more dialogue with Tibetan leaders." In his remarks President Jiang Zemin did not make any reference to the issue of Tibet. Jiang prides himself on his ability to 'handle' the United States and Tibet is a sensitive thorn in the flesh of Sino-US relations. In the past Hu has apparently been suspicious of the United States; in 1994, he reportedly told a secret party meeting that "strangling China's development" was "a strategic principle pursued by the United States". He visited the United States for the first time in 2002.

If Jiang retains his influence and views resolving the Tibetan issue as an important step in China's relations with western nations, further progress may be made in the Party's relationship with the exiled Tibetan Government. Two years ago, influential Chinese academic Wang Lixiong wrote an article called "The Dalai Lama is the key to the future", in which he argued that a deal should be brokered whilst the Dalai Lama was still alive. Wang's views, that a united exile community under the Dalai Lama was preferable to a fragmented exile movement that would create more difficulties for Beijing in the long-term, apparently found supporters amongst a number of government officials in Beijing, but it remains unclear as to whether Hu Jintao is among them.

The current Party Secretary of Tibet, Guo Jinlong is believed to be a close ally of Hu Jintao and, like Hu, emphasises economic reform as a means of consolidating control.