



# Livelihoods Lost?

Globalisation, WTO Accession and the Future of the Tibetan People  
prepared on behalf of Free Tibet Campaign by J.Charles

Copyright

November 2001

  
**FreeTibet**  
C A M P A I G N

# Contents

<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>1 Introduction</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>2 China in the WTO</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>3 The Tibetan Economy and the WTO</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>3.1 Agriculture</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>3.2 Pastoralism</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>4 Conclusion</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>5 Bibliography</b>	<b>18</b>

COVER PHOTOGRAPH: HOWARD J DAVIES

# Executive Summary

The negotiations over China's accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have finally been completed. When a country accedes to the WTO, its inhabitants are not consulted. China is no exception. The Tibetan people were not consulted about China's accession to the World Trade Organisation, but they will nevertheless be subject to its regulations.

China's accession to the WTO signals an acceleration of the processes of economic liberalisation, and thus of globalisation, within China's territory. This report examines recent trends in the Tibetan economy in order to suggest ways in which Tibetans living in U'Tsang, Amdo and Kham (or the Tibetan Autonomous Region of China and Tibetan minorities in other Chinese states such as Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu and Yunnan) may be affected by the WTO agreement and the wider processes of globalisation. In the introduction, the relationships between globalisation, economic liberalisation, the WTO and transnational corporations (TNCs) are clarified, and the historical context of China's widespread denial of Tibetans' economic autonomy is outlined. In the following section, the significance of the WTO to China and to Tibet is discussed. Those aspects of the WTO which are likely to have most significance for the Tibetan people are explained in some detail. This is followed by an assessment of how Tibetan agricultural and pastoral livelihoods (which together constitute well over three quarters of all Tibetan livelihoods) might be affected. Without the benefit of fieldwork, this section seeks to raise pertinent questions rather than detail accurate predictions. The right to livelihood is taken as the central issue at stake as it encompasses many of the social, cultural and economic dimensions of how Tibetans live - unlike narrower terms such as the right to employment or the right to an adequate standard of living. Tibetan independence, all too often, is conceived only within the language of western political science.

It is the principal contention of this paper that China's accession to the WTO and the wider processes of economic liberalisation and globalisation will destroy many Tibetan livelihoods in due course, despite Tibet's poor (but improving) infrastructure leaving it relatively isolated from the impacts of the WTO in the short term.



# 1 Introduction

Globalisation refers to the increasing economic, cultural and political integration of the world's peoples. This report is concerned primarily with globalisation's economic aspects, which include such facets as increasing levels of investment and trade between countries. Economic liberalisation is both a doctrine and a concrete set of policies which encourage globalisation by reducing trade and investment barriers in all sectors of the economy. It is assumed by some that such policies will increase economic growth rates which will in turn benefit the population at large, while others contend that it adversely affects less well off sections of the population and threatens local and global ecologies.

Besides the businesses which manufacture, trade, invest and speculate, there are institutions which provide loans, set regulations and exert considerable influence on governments to put in place policies which favour economic liberalisation and globalisation. The best known and most significant of these institutions are the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The WTO is the main concern of this report as it potentially has the most far-reaching effects on Tibetan livelihoods.

The WTO provides a whole range of regulations which extend economic liberalisation and economic globalisation. These include the removal or reduction of trade in goods and services, from wool to computer chips, and from insurance to education and health provision. Another facet of the WTO is that it seeks to provide businesses with legal protection for its commercial activities. The WTO can accord businesses with worldwide proprietary rights over products. For example if a pharmaceutical TNC was selling a drug in Tibet, WTO regulations which are known as the TRIPs agreement (Trade Related Intellectual Property), if implemented, will ensure that no local company would be able to produce that drug. Indeed, a number of countries, amongst them Brazil and India, are pushing for the ability of countries to ignore TRIPs legislation in the event of any threat to public health. The TRIPs agreement is especially advantageous for TNCs - those companies which operate in more than one country and account for over three quarters of world trade and investment. A further advantage for TNCs is that under WTO regulations (still being negotiated), governments will be unable to favour a local business over a TNC even though the TNC is usually able to market its produce (be it barley or barometers) at lower rates than smaller competitors because of the scale of its operations and the technology that it has available.

This report focuses on those aspects of the WTO agreements which have most significance for the Tibetan people. As 85% of Tibetans derive their livelihoods from agriculture and pastoralism, the most significant parts of the WTO are the agreement on agriculture (AoA) and TRIPs. Other sectors of the economy such as mining and industry are also of great importance especially in ecological terms. Tibetan ecology has great significance both for the Tibetans and for millions of people throughout South and South-East Asia<sup>1</sup>. Industry will have a growing importance for the livelihoods of the Tibetan people as rural livelihoods are lost and more Tibetans move to urban areas to seek employment.

## Historical Context: The Role of China

Processes of globalisation are not entirely new to Tibet. While large-scale investments from overseas are not part of Tibet's past, long-distance trade clearly was as British statistics on trade with Tibet make clear.

An understanding of the Tibetan people's historical context helps to clarify the relationships between WTO accession and the wider processes of globalisation on the one hand, and the micro level

---

<sup>1</sup> Logging, as well as endangering those Tibetan livelihoods which are partly dependent upon sustainable extraction, also endangers many more Tibetan livelihoods through long-term ecological degradation. In addition, the increased siltation load of rivers can result in flooding downstream. This was a factor in Yangtze River floods which left thousands dead, several million homeless and 4.8 million hectares of forest destroyed (Tibetan Government-in-exile 2000). As 6% of Asia's run-off and 34% of India's total river resources have their sources in Tibet (ibid.), the implications of environmental degradation in Tibet are widespread. Some sources even point to relationships between the Tibetan environment and regional weather patterns including the subcontinent's monsoon (Reiter 1993, cited in Tibetan Government-in-exile 2000). Urgent research is needed into how economic liberalisation and WTO accession might impact upon the Tibetan and regional ecosystems through logging, mining, or the construction of dams, etc.

realities of Tibetan lives on the other. Tibet's recent history is one of occupation by China. China's economic policies since the 1950 invasion have had enormous impacts on the lives of the Tibetan people. The collectivisation policies of the Cultural Revolution, from the late 1960s through to the early 1980s, seriously eroded the cultural and economic autonomy of the Tibetan people. From the early 1980s, the 'Household Responsibility System' restored control over livestock to the household, and allowed farmers to retain any surplus produced beyond quota levels. In the 1980s, a concerted attempt to intensify production began (Tibet Government-in-exile 2000). In 1989, the policies of the 1980s were modified as the state sought to extend the amount of Tibetan produce that it appropriated.

In 1991, Deng Xiaoping launched his 'Spring Tide' campaign which was intended to deepen and accelerate economic reform. In Tibet this was framed as an open door policy designed to open up Tibet to foreign investment. Through the 1990s, fixed purchasing rates and considerable levels of state control persisted. Official references to developing the western regions of China have reverberated throughout the 1990s, but have yielded little in concrete terms in most of Tibet as yet. Arguably these overtures reached a crescendo at the Asia Development Bank's annual meeting 2000 in Chiang Mai, where it was announced by Finance Minister Xiang Huaicheng that the Chinese Government is to *"divert most of its investment spending to the regions in a concerted effort to build up the economy of its backward western provinces"* (Financial Times 08.05.00, 10). At least 60% of new fixed asset investment has been earmarked for the new 'Go West Strategy' (Ibid.). Xiang emphasised western China's rich natural resources and cheap labour costs, but pointed to the substantial structural obstacles caused by poor infrastructure (ibid.). China would welcome foreign participation in a range of new projects from roads and railways to water conservation (ibid.). The Tibetan people themselves have had very little say as to what the focus of the 'Go West Strategy' should be.

The period of globalisation, of economic liberalisation and WTO membership will not of course proceed in a vacuum of Chinese policy. State policy will continue to be the primary political agency impacting upon the lives of Tibetans, but transnational forces such as international financial institutions (IFIs) and TNCs will play an increasingly prominent role. As well as TNCs and institutions such as the WTO, the levels of development aid (which stood at circa \$20 million in 1998) look set to rise dramatically (Lafitte 1998). To disassociate the impacts of national and transnational forces is only partially possible. It can nevertheless be expected that there will be discernible differences in the intensity of economic, ecological and cultural change as the processes of globalisation proceed in the aftermath of WTO accession.

The following sections are concerned with how the WTO may effect the livelihoods of the Tibetan people. Is it the case, as the proponents of economic liberalisation and globalisation suggest, that WTO regulations will boost growth which will have widespread benefits? Or is it the case, as many recent analyses of a number of countries suggest, that inequality increases, serious environmental degradation occurs, food insecurity rises, and millions of livelihoods are lost (CIIR 2000; Christian Aid 1999; Action Aid 1999; Patnaik 2000; Shiva et al. 1999)?

## 2 China in the WTO

The WTO came into being in January 1995 after the protracted negotiations known as the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). By setting regulations for trade and trade-related issues, the WTO will integrate more of the world's economies into the international economy, albeit to varying degrees.

The WTO removes trade barriers such as quotas, and reduces tariffs. As has already been emphasised, the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and the TRIPs agreement (Trade Related Intellectual Property) are the most significant aspects of the WTO agreements for Tibetans as over three quarters of Tibetans depend on livestock and cropland.

The AoA requires members to (i) reduce trade distortions in agricultural trade, (ii) reduce domestic subsidies, (iii) reduce export subsidies, (iv) provide for minimum market access. The AoA contains substantial regulatory inequalities between countries. For example, wealthier countries tend to provide much greater subsidies to producers.

The TRIPs agreement has ramifications for farmers' rights to save, exchange and sell seed (Action Aid 1999). Filing for a patent can cost as much as US\$1 million. 97% of patents are held by TNCs based in OECD countries. The growth of patents over items central to livelihoods such as seeds will tend to marginalise economically weaker groups in society.

A further key agreement within the WTO framework is the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) agreement. Its potential impacts will not be analysed here, as it is yet to be completed. Expected to be finalised in 2002, this agreement will liberalise the services sector. Key sectors of the economy from tourism to services, and from health to education, will gradually be opened up to market competition.

China's accession to the WTO has been presaged by bilateral agreements with all member states, although those with the United States and the European Union have had a disproportionate significance. In the EU-China bilaterals, substantial reductions were made in the tariffs of a number of key goods such as rape oil (rape is grown in Tibet; the tariff was cut from 85% to 9%). The tariff on pasta was cut from 25% to 15%, while those on dairy products such as milk powder and butter came down by an average of 275%. Concessions were made by China in the services sector with trade in such sub-sectors as telecommunications, insurance, distribution, banking, accountancy and, significantly for Tibet, tourism. Of considerable importance was China's submission to transparency and non-discrimination in government procurement (which means that the provision of government services will be opened up to the private sector), as well as to the national treatment provisions (these mean that China will be unable to favour domestic producers in key sectors within two years) (EU-China agreement document). Moreover, China agreed to permit foreign companies to own 25% of Chinese enterprises on accession, 35% after one year and 49% after three years (Bridges, 2000).

During the bilateral US-China trade talks, it was agreed that China would cut import duties, eliminate export subsidies, grant the US preferential market access on agricultural items of special interest to the US, establish large and tariff-rate quotas for wheat, corn, rice and cotton, provide US exporters with distribution rights, and provide new access for US insurance companies, as well as for computer services, business consulting, accounting, advertising and financial information services (Acharya 1999).

### **Social Implications for China of WTO Accession**

Buried within its cover story 'The Real Leap Forward', *The Economist* states that joining the WTO would "bring China a great deal of short term pain. The timetable for dismantling local protections is brutally swift" (*The Economist*; 20.11.99). The Chinese agricultural system will see significant changes

as production shifts away (to a degree) from its current emphasis on grain production towards a greater emphasis on exporting to niche markets (Oxford Analytica 2000)- a move which will undermine Chinese food security.

The short-term pain referred to by The Economist is elaborated upon by Oxford Analytica. *"The main efficiency gains from WTO membership would not be the export sectors but the protected and non-traded sectors which will feel the impact of import competition and/or the arrival of new foreign-backed competitors"* (Oxford Analytica 2000). In other words, those sectors of the Chinese economy which can not compete will face massive livelihood losses. In the agricultural sector, where more than 332 million farmers still constitute more than 48% of the workforce, as many as 200 million livelihoods may be lost (Oxford Analytica 2000). With WTO accession offering a projected marginal increase in growth of less than one per cent (ibid.), these rural job losses would only be offset by approximately 2 million new employment opportunities.

Such mass losses of livelihood would be unprecedented in scale in recent decades. However, there are numerous examples of mass losses of livelihoods as a result of the implementation of economic liberalisation measures. Suppan (1996) cites the loss of one million livelihoods in the Mexican maize sector after the initiation of the North American Free Trade Area. Madely cites the loss of an almost equal number in the Indian oilseeds sector (Madely 2000).

One of the consequences of the current wave of economic change in China already in evidence is an increase in social unrest as different sectors of the Chinese people organise to oppose the economic reforms which are affecting their livelihoods. The threat of social unrest has had an impact on the negotiations themselves as the need to maintain order (which the initiation of a liberal democracy would make much harder) is counter-posed with the demands of corporate lobbyists. Hong-Kong-based Information Centre For Human Rights and Democracy estimates that there were up to 100,000 protests throughout China last year caused by rising anger at corruption and painful economic reforms (Zhongguo List, 2000).

Tariff reductions and the abolition of non-tariff measures will in particular pose major challenges to farmers engaged in producing *"low quality products through the use of technologically outdated production methods"* (Oxford Analytica 2000). Almost all Tibetan agricultural production falls into the latter category. Moreover the impacts are expected to be strongest in areas specialising in maize, soybean and wheat production. The latter is the second most significant agricultural crop in Tibet. Areas producing barley (Tibet's most significant food crop) are also expected to be seriously effected.

Oxford Analytica have elucidated a further important implication of WTO accession. *"Sustained agricultural development is critically dependent on the introduction and application of new scientific techniques over the entire range of farm activities. By facilitating foreign investment, WTO membership can lend significant support to this highly capital-intensive, and long-term, modernisation process."* (Oxford Analytica 2000) A number of points can be surmised. While agricultural modernisation has long been a policy of the Chinese Government, and while transnational agribusiness corporations have been involved in China for some time (see Kneen for footnote), capital injections and increased involvement of transnational agribusiness corporations will accelerate existing trends of change in agricultural production and distribution systems. While agricultural modernisation has positive implications as well as negative ones, the application of 'new agricultural techniques' points to more widespread use of capital-intensive machinery, soil-degrading inputs and, possibly, genetically modified crop varieties.

While the WTO and the globalisation processes that it assists are likely to have significant impacts upon their livelihoods, it is worth re-emphasising that the Tibetans have had no say in the drafting of the

WTO agreement (nor have the inhabitants of the more than 130 WTO member countries). The Chinese Government - in line with its wider policy of denying freedom of expression - has negotiated the agreements without democratic recourse. Now that Tibet is subject to the WTO agreement, key issues pertaining to its economy can be decided to a large degree by those who lobby the WTO, and by an unelected WTO dispute settlement panel. Since such a significant agreement has been negotiated without the consent of the Tibetan people, it is important that questions are asked and research undertaken to establish how China's accession to the WTO and the wider processes of globalisation might impact upon each sector of the Tibetan economy.



CATHERINE PLATT

### 3 The Tibetan Economy and the WTO

Tibet, due to its physical isolation and poor infrastructure (there is currently no railway in the Tibet Autonomous Region [TAR] and few navigable roads), is relatively isolated from the impacts of globalisation and WTO accession. It has been argued that the links between the Chinese and Tibetan economies are weak not just because of poor infrastructure but also because its producers are at a disadvantage due to relatively high production costs, shorter growing seasons and longer haulage distances (Lafitte 2000). Moreover, most Tibetans are not that integrated into markets, and instead lead subsistence-oriented lives with what little surplus remains after the payment of taxes being absorbed by Chinese city dwellers (*ibid.*). However, academic research conducted in Tibet in the 1990s indicates that the market linkages between rural and urban Tibet are growing (Clarke 1994). Even if the direct links between rural Tibetan livelihoods and the Chinese economy remain limited, indirect linkages are clearly there. Tibetan and Chinese produce competes in the same urban market places for example. Moreover import and export figures into and out of Tibet point to rapidly escalating long-distance economic links. In 1965, exports from the TAR were US\$390,000, and imports were valued at US\$2 million. By 1998, imports had risen, according to official figures, to US\$39.5 million, while exports had also climbed substantially (Tibet Statistical Yearbook 2000, 255). If current Chinese development plans for the western regions are even partially implemented, those linkages would grown substantially. There is good reason to believe that infrastructural improvements will be made. Zhu Rongji has described the large-scale development of the western regions as a major policy decision (China Embassy). The implications for Tibet are perhaps especially high in the agricultural sectors as China as a whole is facing substantial falls in its amounts of cropland (due to processes of desertification and water shortages, especially in parts of the north and west of the country and in the Yellow river basin) while there are recent signs that the cultivated areas of western China are growing in size (Patnaik 2000).

Agriculture and pastoralism account for the livelihoods of 86.16% of the TAR's population (China Agriculture Yearbook 1998). The potential impact of WTO accession on Tibetan livelihoods will be examined in relation to these sectors. Even in these rural sectors, the growing linkages between Tibetan livelihoods and wider markets become clear. The significance of market linkages is great since (as will become clear below) the impact of the WTO will be greater on those livelihoods which are more closely integrated into markets. In Tibet outside the TAR, the structure of the economy is similar. Pastoralism is the largest sector in most counties in terms of livelihoods. Agriculture, resource extraction, industry and commerce make up the rest.

Since the policy changes of the 1980s, there has been an increase in production of livestock and grain as commodities for markets (Clarke 1994, 2). The numbers of livestock on the grasslands has increased. More and more nomads have been sedentarised (often forcibly). According to an anthropological account, production in rural areas has become increasingly linked to market sales in the growing towns. Transmigration into Tibet has intensified. These trends - increased levels of production in agriculture and livestock linked to growing urban demand and trade - have placed a strain on natural resources, which continue to be extracted at alarming rates (*ibid.*).

The food deficit is rising. In response, Chinese policy makers have two primary methods of expanding agricultural production in Tibet. The first of these is to boost yields on existing farmland through mechanisation and chemical fertilisers. The second is to increase the area of land under cultivation (Tibet Government in exile 2000). The first method threatens Tibet's ecosystem through pollution and long-term soil degradation. The second will affect pastoralist economies.

Intensification of animal husbandry in the western regions remains a policy objective of the Chinese administration. In the TAR, slaughter rates indicate that there is considerable scope for intensification. There were over 5.7 million head of livestock in 1997, compared with 4.8 million in Qinghai Province (China Agriculture Yearbook 1998). This was a significant quantity in relation to the rest of China (4.1%). However, in terms of livestock slaughtered, Tibet's percentage of the Chinese total shrinks to 0.029%. This would indicate that the livestock sector is likely to feel the effects of accelerated

liberalisation most forcefully. While economic output is an extremely inaccurate measure of economic activity in Tibet (it excludes self-sufficient production), it offers a valuable insight into those sectors of the Tibetan economy which are most highly integrated and marketised, and thus more likely to feel the impacts of globalisation. It also illustrates how the sectors which employ the bulk of the Tibetan population relate to the Chinese economy as a whole.

**Table 1 Output Value of Production in 1997 in units of 100 million yuan (source: China Agriculture Yearbook 1998)**

Total Output Value of Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries (All China) .....	24 587.68
Total Output Value of Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries (TAR) .....	41.45
Total Output Value of Agriculture (TAR) .....	21.82
Total Output Value of Animal Husbandry .....	18.76
Total Output Value of Forestry .....	0.86
Total Output Value of Fisheries .....	0.02

Within the TAR, official sources indicate that the number of Tibetans is 2.5 million (China Agriculture Yearbook 1998). The following table shows the distribution of Tibetans in Tibetan prefectures outside the TAR.

**Table 2. Tibetan Population by state prefecture/county 1994 (Cooke and Marshall,1997)**

State/ Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture / Tibetan and Qiang A-P/ Mongolian and Tibetan AP/Tibet Autonomous County	Number of Tibetans	% of Tibetans
<b>Qinghai</b> .....	972,500	20.5%
Tsonub Mongolian and Tibetan AP.....	32,900	10%
Malho TAP .....	123,400	64%
Golog TAP.....	112,600	88%
Tsojang TAP .....	55,900	17%
Yushu TAP.....	233,800	96.5%
Tsolho TAP .....	207,200	54%
Outside TAPs/M&TAP .....	206,300	6.5%
<b>Gansu</b> .....	390,000	1.6%
Kanlho TAP.....	297,900	48.6%
<b>Sichuan</b> .....	1,160,000	1.5%
Kartse TAP .....	668,000	76%
Ngawa T& QAP .....	400,000	48.8%
Mili .....	37,000	30%
Outside TAP/ T&QAP/ TAC.....	55,000	0.07%
<b>Yunnan</b> .....	119,000	0.3%
Dechen TAP.....	111,200	33%
<b>Total Tibetan Population in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan</b> .....	2, 641, 500	

## 3.1 Agriculture

The primary crops under cultivation in the TAR (in terms of area) in 1998 were barley (126,000 units), wheat (94,000 units), and beans (12,000 units) (Tibet Statistical Yearbook 1999, 156). In terms of output (tons), 500,000 tons out of 850,000 tons were barley, 240,000 were wheat and 5000 were rice (ibid,159). In the past crop rotation and mixed crop cultivation were practised in Tibetan agriculture. Chinese policy since 1950 has, to a certain extent, shifted Tibetan agriculture towards techniques which require greater inputs, more intensive land use and mono-cropping. Quota systems, fixed procurement prices and high levels of taxation persist (Tibetan Government-in-exile 2000). Inappropriate agricultures seem to have been encouraged, in part by multilateral agencies. Some sources for example claim that subsidised wheat, which is being grown in greater quantities in Tibet largely to suit Chinese food tastes, has seen its output decrease rapidly after initially promising harvests because it is less suited to the Tibetan soils than barley, resulting in soil nutrient depletion (Waiser 1998).

Agriculture accounts for the livelihoods of fewer Tibetans than the pastoral sector. Agriculture along the major Tibetan rivers - the Driчу (Mekong), Zachu (Yangtze), Gyalho (Salween), Machu (Yellow) and Yarlung Tsangyпо (Brahmaputra) - had, in tandem with livestock products and intra and inter-regional trade, seemingly provided the Tibetan people with a self-reliant economy (Tibetan Government in-exile, 2000). While agriculture remains concentrated around these rivers, and particularly around the Yarlung Tsangyпо and its tributaries in south central TAR, the increase in the numbers of Chinese living in these areas has had a considerable impact not just upon the urban settlements of the region and the consequent rise in demand which has left Tibet with a growing food deficit, but also upon the levels of market integration. How could WTO accession impact upon farmers? Previously observed patterns of agrarian change cannot be applied to create a detailed hypothesis as too many unpredictable variables exist. However, more general hypotheses can be made.

### Depressed Prices and Insecure Markets

The liberalisation of prices would in theory allow artificially low state grain procurement prices to rise. However, in a context of massive imports of cheap grains from overseas, this is unlikely to occur as domestic prices will be depressed by the import influx.

Wen Tiejun, of the Rural Economy Research Centre of the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture has argued this point unequivocally when stating that "*WTO entry will depress farmer incomes, particularly in the centre and west of China*" (Wen Tiejun, 1999). Not only will market integrated Tibetan farmers be unable to achieve greater prices for their produce (particularly but not exclusively with regard to grains), they will face shrinking markets for their produce in the face of cheap imports. As market integrated farmers rely upon selling their surplus to purchase part of their economic reproductive requirements, they would be seriously affected by the loss of markets, and may not be able to sustain their livelihoods.

### Displacement of Livelihoods through Imports

Large capital-intensive farms in countries such as the US will be able to use the market access provisions of the WTO agreement to increase exports to China, as well as the 15 year bilateral agreement (until 2014) between the US and China which continues to permit the US to dump agricultural produce on China (the latter will remove the danger of rising US export prices in the wake of its submission to the domestic support provisions of the AoA). As the White House put it, "*China's entry to the World Trade Organisation will slash barriers to the sale of American agricultural products in the world's most populous country ... this agreement locks in and expands our access to a market over one billion people*" (White House, 2000).

China made substantial one-way market-opening concessions in the US-China WTO accession

deal. As a consequence of the agreement, US exports to China look set to rise substantially ([www.fas.usda.gov/itp/china/deal.html](http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/china/deal.html)). As grains (barley and wheat) are the most significant agricultural products in Tibetan areas, the lifting of China's ban on imports of wheat and other grains from the Pacific North West is significant, as are the wider offers that China has made on wheat, which will lock in important long-term market opportunities for the US. Liberalisation of Chinese markets will provide a welcome aggregate boost in demand for world grains, and could raise prices internationally - a welcome development for large producers but problematic for grain (especially wheat) producers (Agence Europe, 2000).

Barley, Tibet's most important agricultural crop, will have its import quota removed by China under the WTO accession agreement. In its place will be a 9% tariff (USDA). Moreover China has agreed that within three years of accession, *"any entity will be able to import most products, including grain, into any part of China"* ([www.fas.usda.gov/itl/china/grains.html](http://www.fas.usda.gov/itl/china/grains.html)).

While agricultural imports are clearly set to rise substantially, the distance of Tibetan markets from the arrival ports is so great that the amount of imports reaching Tibetan areas will be reduced. However, two phenomena indicate that a significant influx of these goods into Tibetan areas will nevertheless occur.

Firstly, agricultural commodities are already being imported into Tibetan areas in substantial quantities. In 1998, for example, over 70,000 tons of grains were imported into Tibet (Tibet Statistical Yearbook, 1999, 232). Secondly, there is an existing deficit of agricultural produce in much of Tibet. Demand will pull those cheaper grains into Tibet. If such imports exceed the deficits, as would almost inevitably be the case, then the markets upon which some Tibetan farmers depend would be reduced.

### **Rising Input Costs**

While liberalisation would eventually remove any further compulsory purchasing of inputs, farmers would probably have to pay more for them due to China's long-term commitments within the WTO framework which includes input subsidies ([www.fas.usda.gov/itp/china/ag-gen.html](http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/china/ag-gen.html), 2000). It was the issue of China holding developing country status in relation to domestic subsidies (developing countries have a 10% threshold on domestic subsidies as opposed to a 5% threshold for developed countries) which proved the major sticking point in the January 2001 accession talks. The Chinese state has been subsidising the use of artificial fertilisers in Tibet by providing payments to the Tibetan transport sector (Clarke 1994). The increasing penetration of Chinese and Tibetan agricultural input markets by transnational agribusiness corporations could see prices rise further, putting further pressure on small-scale producers.

In the Lhasa valley, the use of fertilisers has risen substantially, raising the spectre of soil degradation (Osmaston). The chemical input cycle of increased yields, followed by a drop-off in produce due to the declining fertility of soils, tends to lead farmers into a period of dependence. Farmers could thus become dependent upon the providers of inputs, with debts and tied production a possible consequence. Moreover, as less than ten TNCs control the majority of the global agricultural inputs market (Dinham 1998), the independence of price fluctuations is far from assured.

### **Non-marketised Production**

The percentage of farming for self-sufficient purposes varies from county to county within Tibetan areas. Agriculture in Dzamthung County in Ngawa Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture (T & QAP) is an example of where most agricultural production is not produced for markets but for household consumption. At the other extreme are areas such as those in Malho TAP, where more intensive agricultural production is carried out for the market. Those areas producing for household

consumption are likely to decrease in size over time as the influx of Chinese settlers continues and urban areas increase in size. The ecological impacts associated with WTO accession (discussed elsewhere in this paper) have implications for the sustainability of all Tibetan rural livelihoods, including non-marketised producers.

### **Intellectual Property Rights and Biotechnology**

The WTO TRIPs agreement could have significant impacts in Tibet. The United States is set to arrange the study of the US seed industry which will include meetings with US government and international agencies involved with biotech seed ([www.ustr.gov/agreements/ag.html](http://www.ustr.gov/agreements/ag.html)). China and the United States will hold a joint seminar on the commercialisation of biotech projects and cooperative research is to be undertaken on transgenic plant technology, "*including research on target genes of major crops, genetic engineering, genetic breeding, and development and utilisation of transgenic crops*" (ibid.). Development of feed resources and the use of biotechnology to improve feed quality, feed conversion rates, and the development of new feed resources will also be pursued (ibid.).

It remains to be seen how such policy initiatives and joint undertakings will be applied, and how agricultural technologies, such as genetically engineered seeds, will be used in Tibet. In view of Tibet's growing food deficit, the possibility of increased yields in the short-term might lead to such technologies being applied relatively widely in Tibet. As well as the still unclear ecological impacts of these technologies, the expected yield increases do not always occur. The wave of suicides in the cotton-growing district in Warangal, in Andhra Pradesh, India indicates the unreliability of genetically engineered seeds (Shiva et al. 1999). Farmers have seen existing debts spiral upwards following the poor performances of genetically modified cotton (Christian Aid 1999). A number of studies indicate the links between farmer suicides and the use of genetically-engineered seeds.

A further important possible implication is in the realm of property rights. The TRIPs agreement could lead to the patenting of seeds which would lock agriculturalists into dependence on commercial sources for their seed. This would provide a substantial increase to their input costs and would threaten the livelihoods of less well-off farmers. Another implication of the TRIPs agreement concerns the use of more than 12,000 species of 1,500 types of vascular plants in Tibet (Tibet Government-in-exile 2000). Tibet has a wide variety of such plants, all of which could be patented (privatised) under the TRIPs agreement.

The Chinese Government's support for genetically engineering, and the apparent interest among Chinese scientists in the genetics of yaks and barley indicate that these are areas which may potentially be patented by Chinese or transnational commercial interests enjoying the extra protection provided by the TRIPs agreement.

## 3.2 Pastoralism

The rangelands of Tibet cover 70% of the plateau, and support over a million nomads and semi-nomads (Tibet Government-in-exile 2000). In 1960, the plateau within the TAR supported 9.6 million head of livestock. By 1998, this had risen to 22.5 million (Tibet Statistical Yearbook 1999). The economic position of nomadic pastoralists vary considerably. They fare noticeably better in counties such as Zoige and Litang than in counties such as Dege (Cooke and Marshall). Fencing, overstocking and conversion of rangelands into farmland are key issues for Tibet's nomadic pastoralists, all of which relate to the two key analytical categories used in this paper to discuss the potential impacts of WTO accession on Tibet's pastoral sector - increased market integration and sedentarisation. The latter is itself part of the Chinese development strategy of intensifying and marketising production, and of integrating the economies of the nomads into the national economy.

### Market Integration and Sedentarization

Again, it is worth emphasising the levels of Tibet's market integration, as it is often portrayed as economically detached from the rest of China with the exception of the extraction of natural resources. Exports out of, and imports into Tibet have grown exponentially in recent decades, with imports rising from a value of US\$390,000 in 1965 to US\$39.5 million in 1998. Moreover the TAR export composition of 1997 reveals that after grains, pastoral products were the most important export along with light industrial products and Chinese medicines (Tibet Statistical Yearbook 1999, 255). Carpets were the fifth most significant export.

Long-established practices of barter trade have been increasingly displaced by the growing market integration of Tibetan pastoralists, particularly in peri-urban areas (Clarke 1994). In such areas, the growth of livestock output is linked to trade in grain and salt, and has occurred in the context of a growing transport network (ibid.). It is also set against the policy background of the return of livestock management to households in the 1980s (Clarke). Meat, wool, dairy and hide products are all increasingly produced for the market as part of the drive to boost livestock productivity in the western regions. A number of counties within Tibetan autonomous prefectures have been targeted as principal yak production centres in part to satisfy the growing demand within China as a whole (source: personal communication).

Production areas of such livestock products tend not to have processing or storage facilities. For example, the sheep's wool produced in Nyagchu is processed in the predominantly non-Tibetan county of Chagzam. There are however abattoirs in many Tibetan pastoral areas. The level of intensification varies considerably. In Tsolho TAP, Gepasumdo County is the site of pronounced intensification in the pastoral sector as well as in the agricultural sector. Its abattoir intensifies the use of sheep and beef products for the canned meat market (Cooke and Marshall 1997, 2081). Here, there is a considerable amount of fenced grazing land, as well as machine-harvested fields (Cooke and Marshall 1997, 2081).

*"Tsolho's farming and pastoral industries have been subject to state management and intensive development. Forced labour camps played a pivotal pioneering role in farming and herding. Harvests are high, but both land and culture have been eroded as a result"* (Cooke and Marshall 1997, 1593).

In Malho TAP, Qinghai, there are a number of 'settled nomad' villages such as Ganjiaxing, which is *"composed of dull barrack-like dwellings with pens for animals on the settlement's edge"* (Cooke and Marshall 1997, 2130). As well as the loss of pastoral lands, and dependence on capital-intensive agricultural production, the practice of forced sedentarisation generates a secondary wave of economic problems through the ecological degradation that overgrazing and subsequent soil erosion can create.

Official sources assert that 65% of Tsolho TAP's nomads have been settled and that 275,000 hectares had been fenced off (Cooke and Marshall 1997, 2081). These figures will have since risen under the prefecture's state policy of *"turning grass into an industry"* (ibid.). With the industrialisation

of grass will come industrially produced inputs. In the late 1980s, Tibetan pastoralism was not linked to grain production in a feed complex. However, the intensification of production leads onto increasing proportions of livestock's sustenance being provided by industrially produced feeds. This creates dependence on high cost inputs which will push some pastoralists out of production. It is also a sector which stands to be substantially affected by the import influx.

Sedentarisation - often forced - is a widespread phenomenon. It is more widely practised in Ngawa T & QAP, and in Qinghai than in Kartse TAP. 52,000 out of Qinghai Province's 91,000 pastoral families had been sedentarised by 1994 according to official statistics (Cooke and Marshall 1997, 2384). A number of state ranches exist such as Abaxizn muchang in Ngawa county (Cooke and Marshall 1997, 1124). All those Tibetans interviewed in this detailed body of research were fiercely opposed to this policy. Four clear economic and ecological consequences of this policy have been identified by Cooke and Marshall besides the denial of economic and cultural autonomy. Firstly, it reduces pastoralists' claims to their land and its uses. Secondly, it increases land degradation through overgrazing threatening livelihoods in the medium term. Thirdly, it opens former pastoral areas to mining. Fourthly, it leaves the former nomads largely dependent on markets for their economic reproduction.

What are the implications of accelerated liberalisation and WTO accession? Although pastoralists in Mongolia and pastoralists in Tibet inhabit very different historical, economic and political contexts, the impacts of a marketised, liberalised economy on Mongolian pastoralists can offer some indication of potential pitfalls or benefits for Tibetan pastoralists. In Mongolia, the liberalisation process has created substantial problems for nomads (Goldstein and Beall 1990).

*"Livestock markets slumped, offtake was reduced and many herders retreated into self-provisioning ... Some herders did well at privatisation and since, but others did not, and extreme rural wealth differentials have reappeared for the first time since the 1930s ... Rural poverty has increased to levels unknown since the 1930s"* (Swift 1995).

The agreement by China to reduce its beef tariffs from 45% to 12% on frozen beef, and from 45% to 25% on fresh beef will lead to substantial imports to satisfy increasing demand for meat amongst Chinese populations. Thus, in the medium term, pastoralists who have been drawn into supplying for the market could have their markets adversely effected as they face increasing competition in their marketplaces. The intensified enclosure production of sedentarised nomads would be integrated into wider markets on the input side as well as on the output side. That is, they would become dependent on the supply of processed feeds. Those areas unable to meet local demand will increasingly import maize feeds directly from international markets. Moreover, the possible relaxation of state pricing would expose livestock production to the uncertainties of fluctuating market prices. The combined overall impact would be to displace tens of thousands of nomads from their livelihoods and to produce amongst the remainder an increasing socio-economic differentiation. The privatisation of land would exacerbate the problem further.

WTO accession, by broadening and intensifying market integration and production, could exacerbate grassland degradation, the loss of lands and autonomy through sedentarisation, and the threats posed to livelihoods.

## 4 Conclusion

This paper has provided strong indications that substantial numbers of rural Tibetan livelihoods are at risk as a result of WTO accession and the wider processes of globalisation. It has also aimed to prompt debate and further enquiries into three principal questions.

These three questions can be summarised as follows: What is happening to Tibetans living in a context of WTO accession and globalisation? How is it happening? Who/what are the agents involved?

- In seeking to answer the first question, the impacts of accession on Tibetan livelihoods and ecosystems are sought, as are its impacts on cultural autonomy.
- Detailed accounts of the processes of change which carry economic and ecological dangers for Tibetans are sought. The processes of globalisation are not ubiquitous. They also far from uniform in their impacts. Examples of these processes include the commodification of natural resources, and the unequal and unstable terms of market integration.
- These processes have been set in motion and maintained by a number of agents. The final question is an enquiry into who these agents are. The WTO can not be viewed in isolation but as a significant actor in the contemporary context. The Chinese state, international financial institutions (such as the WTO and the World Bank) and TNCs all play a role within the changing patterns of domination, as do the agencies emerging from the economic and political imbalances between and within Tibetan sectors and localities. The sources of domination and oppression within Tibet did not begin with the Chinese invasion and subsequent occupation. Romanticised notions of pre-invasion Tibet hinder the analysis of the predicament of the Tibetan people, and the search for greater freedom and autonomy for the Tibetan people. Contemporary patterns of domination and oppression within Tibet need, arguably, to be viewed as multifaceted sets of conflicts between rural and urban interests, Chinese and Tibetan interests, TNC and Tibetan interests, and even as conflicts between different groups of Tibetans.

Finally, it is worth noting that though China's accession is now confirmed, its implementation is far from assured. Globalisation, as well as producing diverse impacts, is also far from inevitable. It is being, and will continue to be, contested and modified by numerous social agents – from NGOs to community-based social movements.

# Bibliography

- Acharya, A, (1999) "The New Deal: China on the Threshold of WTO" in Economic and Political Weekly (18/12/1999).
- Ackerly, J, (1995) Tibet: A Case Study in the Shortcomings of the UN System. UN Agencies Require Review, Restructuring to Combat Poverty, Unemployment in Tibet (ICT)
- Ackerly, J, Wheat Wars: Aid Linked to China's Control of Tibet
- Action Aid (1999a) The Agreement on Agriculture – Domestic Support (London: Action Aid)
- Action Aid (1999b) The Agreement on Agriculture – Export Subsidies (London: Action Aid)
- Action Aid (1999c) The Agreement on Agriculture – Dumping (London: Action Aid)
- Action Aid (1999d) The Agreement on Agriculture – Market Access: Free Trade Rhetoric and Protectionist Realities (London: Action Aid).
- Action Aid (1999e) Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and Farmers' Rights (London: Action Aid)
- Action Aid (1999f) Crops and Robbers : Biopiracy and the Patenting of Staple Food Crops (London: Action Aid).
- Agence Europe (2000), [Summary of OECD Report on World Agriculture] (e-mail communication; ag-impact@iatp.org)
- Australia Tibet Council, (1998) Foreign Investment in Tibet: Identifying the Industries Likeliest to Attract Foreign Capital (Collingwood, Victoria).
- Australia Tibet Council, Foreign Investment in Tibet: Identifying the Industries Likeliest to Attract Foreign Capital: Highways (Collingwood: ATC)
- Bello, W, and Mittal, A (2000), 'Dangerous Liaisons: Progressives, the Right, and the Anti-China Trade Campaign' (Institute for Food and Development Policy/Food First at <http://www.foodfirst.org/media/opeds/2000/5-china.html>)
- Boyu, J, 'The Impact of GATT/WTO on World Agriculture And World Peasants' at <http://www.chinabulletin.com/e/gatt.txt>
- Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest (2000), EU and China Reach WTO Accession Agreement (Vol. 4, No. 20)
- Brown, L, and Halweil, B (1998), China's Water Shortage Could Shake World Food Security (Worldwatch Institute)
- Changhe, L, "Precipitation and Farmland Irrigation in Valleys of the Middle Reaches of the Yarlung Zangbo Jiang, Southern Xixang (Tibet)" in Chinese Journal of Arid and Land Research (Vol. 5, No. 3).
- China Agriculture Yearbook (China Agricultural Press 1998).
- China Embassy, 'China Sets Goals for Agriculture in 2000' at <http://www.china-embassy.org/CGI-Bin/Press.pl?NL200001-03>
- China Embassy, 'Overseas Businesspeople Welcome to Invest in China's West' at <http://www.china-embassy.org/economy/west002.htm>
- China Embassy, 'China Sets Major Tasks for Development of Western Areas' at <http://www.china-embassy.org/economy/west001.htm>
- Christian Aid (1999), Selling Suicide: Farming, False Promises and Genetic Engineering in Developing Countries (London. Christian Aid)
- CIIR (2000), Trade and Food Security: An Assessment of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (London, CIIR).
- Clarke, G, (1987), China's Reforms of Tibet, and Their Effects on Pastoralism (Institute of Development Studies).
- Clarke, G, Socio-Economic Change and the Environment in a Pastoral Area of Lhasa Municipality
- Clarke, G, (1994) Environmental Sustainability, Development and Planning in Tibet: Provisional Findings and Conclusions
- Cooke, S, and Marshall, S, (1997) Tibet Outside the TAR: Control, Exploitation and Assimilation. Development with Chinese Characteristics [CD-Rom] (Alliance for Research in Tibet).
- Dinham, B (1998) 'The Pesticide Business: Impact on Food Security' in Pesticides News (No.42)
- The Economist, "The Real Leap Forward" in The Economist (01/12/1999)

- European Commission, Bilateral Trade Relations: China Overview (<http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/bilateral/china/china.htm>)
- Qiahe, Y, and Changde, L, "Water Surplus and Deficiency for Crop Production in the Farming Area of the Xixang (Tibet) Autonomous Region" in Chinese Journal of Arid and Land Research (Vol. 5, No. 3).
- Gahrten, P,(2000) "China in the WTO - In Whose Interest?" in Third World Resurgence (No 114/115)[[www.twinside.org.sg](http://www.twinside.org.sg)]
- Goldstein M, and Beall, C,(1990) Nomads of Western Tibet: The Survival of a Way of Life (London: Serinda)
- Heilig, G, Fischer, G, and van Velthuisen, H, (2000) Can China Feed Itself? An Analysis of China's Food Prospects with Special Reference to Water Resources (Laxenburg: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis)
- Kneen, B (1995), Invisible giant : Cargill and its transnational strategies (Pluto: London and Boulder, Colorado).
- Lafitte, G, (1998)"Using Aid as a Political Weapon" in Green Tibet (TGIE)
- Lafitte, G (2000) e-mail communication, 15.07.00.
- Madely, J (ed.) (2000), Hungry for Trade (Zed Books: London).
- Mittal, A and Rosset, P (2000) 'The Real Enemy is the WTO, not China' (Institute for Food and Development Policy/Food First at <http://www.foodfirst.org/media/opeds/2000/3-1-china.html>)
- Osmaston, H, Agriculture in the Main Lhasa Valley
- Oxford Analytica (2000), China Business Summit: Briefing Document (<http://www.weforum.or...Summit++Oxford+Analytica+Briefing>)
- Patnaik, U, and Natrajan, S (2000), 'Output and Employment in Rural China: Some Post-Reform Problems' in Economic and Political Weekly, September 16.
- Schuff, S, (2000) House Victory on China PNTR Propels Bill to Senate for Next Round (Feedstuffs Washington Bureau)
- Sheehy, D, (1996) "Sustainable Livestock Use of Pastoral resources" in Bruun, O, and Odgaard, (eds.), Mongolia in Transition: Old Patterns, New Challenges (Curzon Press: Richmond).
- Shiva, V, et al. (1999), in Economic and Political Weekly.
- The Sino-EU Agreement on China's Accession to the WTO: Results of the Bilateral Negotiations
- Songqiao, Z, and Yuancun, S,(1990) "Physical Conditions and Agricultural Development in the Qaidam" in Chinese Journal of Arid Land Research (Vol 3, No.4).
- Suppan, S (1996) (IATP: Minneapolis).
- Swift, J, (1995)"Rural Development: The Livestock Sector" in Griffin, K, (ed.) Poverty and the Transition to a Market Economy (Basingstoke: MacMillan).
- Tibet Government-in-exile, [Environment and Development 2000]
- Tibet Government-in-exile, Guidelines for International Development Projects in Tibet (<http://tibet.com/aidTibet.html>).
- Tibet Government-in-exile, Assessment of Project: Agricultural Development, Lhasa River Valley, Tibet (<http://tibet.com/Eco/Green97/project.html>)
- Tibet Statistical Yearbook, 1999 & 2000
- Tibetan Youth Congress,(1995) Development for Whom?: A Report on the Chinese Development Strategies in Tibet and their Impacts (Dharamsala: Tibetan Youth Congress)
- Tiejun, W, (1999), "China and the WTO: WTO and China's Agriculture, Rural Villages and Farmers" in Hua Xia Wen Zhai (No. 457).
- Tsona, N, Chinese Development Projects in Tibet: A Tibetan Perspective (TGIE)
- United States Department of Agriculture, Agriculture- General (<http://www.fas.gov/itp/china/ag-gen.html>)
- United States Department of Agriculture, US-China WTO Accession Agreement (<http://www.fas.gov/itp/china/accession.html>)

United States Department of Agriculture, The US-China Accession Deal: A Strong Deal in the Best Interests of US Agriculture (<http://www.fas.gov/itp/china/deal.html>)

United States Department of Agriculture, Wood (<http://www.fas.gov/itp/china/wood.html>)

United States Department of Agriculture, Cotton (<http://www.fas.gov/itp/china/cotton.html>)

United States Department of Agriculture, Dairy (<http://www.fas.gov/itp/china/dairy.html>)

United States Department of Agriculture, Distilled Spirits, Beer and Wine (<http://www.fas.gov/itp/china/spirits.html>)

United States Department of Agriculture, Distribution Services (<http://www.fas.gov/itp/china/distribution.html>)

United States Department of Agriculture, Fish (<http://www.fas.gov/itp/china/fish.html>)

United States Department of Agriculture, Grains (<http://www.fas.gov/itp/china/grains.html>)

United States Department of Agriculture, Meats (<http://www.fas.gov/itp/china/meats.html>)

United States Department of Agriculture, Oilseeds (<http://www.fas.gov/itp/china/oilseeds.html>)

United States Department of Agriculture, US-China Agricultural Cooperation Agreement: Removal of Sanitary/Phytosanitary Barriers to US Exports of Citrus, Meat and Grains (<http://www.fas.gov/itp/china/sps.html>)

United States Department of Agriculture, State and State-Invested Enterprises (<http://www.fas.gov/itp/china/state.html>).

United States Department of Agriculture, Specialty Crops (<http://www.fas.gov/itp/china/specialty.html>).

United States Department of Agriculture, Textiles and Apparel (<http://www.fas.gov/itp/china/textiles.html>).

United States Department of Agriculture, Textiles: Special Safeguard (<http://www.fas.gov/itp/china/text-spec.html>).

United States Department of Agriculture, Agreement on US-China Agricultural Cooperation (<http://www.ustr.gov/agreements/ag.html>)

United States Embassy, China 1999 Investment Climate (<http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/english/economics/991014a.html>).

Waiser, K, (1998) "Chinese Development Trends in Tibet" in Green Tibet (Dharamsala: TGIE)

White House, (2000), The US-China Accession Deal: A Strong Deal in the Best Interests of US Agriculture (White House).

World Bank "China Western Poverty Reduction Project: Credit and Project Summary" (<http://www.worldbank.org/html/ext...p/projects/china/wprp/chindex.htm>)

World Economic Forum, Chinese Business Summit 2000 ([www.weforum.org](http://www.weforum.org))

World Economic Forum, Chinese Business Summit 1999 ([www.weforum.org](http://www.weforum.org))

World Food Programme, (1996) Annual Review Report [Project No. 3357]

World Trade Organisation (2000), Draft Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China to the WTO.

Yan, Y, (1999) "The Fate of Tibet" [A review of Wang, L, (1998) Sky Burial: The Fate Of Tibet (Hong Kong: Mirror Books Ltd)] in China Journal (No43)

Yanhua, L, "Prospects for the Sustainable Development of Agriculture and Habitation in Tibet (Xixang Autonomous Region) in the 21st Century" in Chinese Journal of Arid Land Research (Vol 5, No.3).

Yanhua, L, (1992) Dynamics of Highland Agriculture in Lhasa District, Tibet (ICIMOD, Kathmandu).

Yin, Yunxiang (2000) 'The Fate of Tibet' (review) in The China Journal

Yue, F, and Wang, J, (2000) "We Should Not Take The Old Road In Large-Scale Development - Interview with Tibetan Autonomous Regional Secretary Chen Kuiyuan" in Renmin Ribao (27.03.00)

Zhang Zhiliang, (1989) "Agricultural Development in the Qaidam Basin and Ecological Problems" in China Journal of Arid Land Research (Vol 2, Number 2).

Zhongguo List (2000), 'Chinese Riot Police in Violent Clashes with 20,000 Farmers' ([zhongguo@lists.tao.ca](mailto:zhongguo@lists.tao.ca)).

**Free Tibet Campaign stands for the Tibetans' right to determine their own future. It campaigns for an end to the Chinese occupation of Tibet and for the Tibetans' fundamental human rights to be respected.**



FREE TIBET CAMPAIGN

**For further information contact:** Free Tibet Campaign  
1 Rosoman Place  
London  
EC1R 0JY

**T:** 020 7833 9958  
**F:** 020 7833 3838  
**E:** [mail@freetibet.org](mailto:mail@freetibet.org)  
**W:** [www.freetibet.org](http://www.freetibet.org)

**FreeTibet**  
CAMPAIGN

